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Abstract
Background: We are currently experiencing an unprecedented challenge, managing and containing an outbreak of
a new coronavirus disease known as COVID-19. While China—where the outbreak started—seems to have been able
to contain the growth of the epidemic, different outbreaks are nowadays present in multiple countries. Nonetheless,
authorities have taken action and implemented containment measures, even if not everything is known.
Methods: To facilitate this task, we have studied the effect of different containment strategies that can be put into
effect. Our work referred initially to the situation in Spain as of February 28, 2020, where a few dozens of cases had
been detected, but has been updated to match the current situation as of 13 April. We implemented an SEIR
metapopulation model that allows tracing explicitly the spatial spread of the disease through data-driven stochastic
simulations.
Results: Our results are in line with the most recent recommendations from the World Health Organization, namely,
that the best strategy is the early detection and isolation of individuals with symptoms, followed by interventions and
public recommendations aimed at reducing the transmissibility of the disease, which, although might not be
sufficient for disease eradication, would produce as a second order effect a delay of several days in the raise of the
number of infected cases.
Conclusions: Many quantitative aspects of the natural history of the disease are still unknown, such as the amount of
possible asymptomatic spreading or the role of age in both the susceptibility and mortality of the disease. However,
preparedness plans and mitigation interventions should be ready for quick and efficacious deployment globally. The
scenarios evaluated here through data-driven simulations indicate that measures aimed at reducing individuals’ flow
are much less effective than others intended for early case identification and isolation. Therefore, resources should be
directed towards detecting as many and as fast as possible the new cases and isolate them.
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Background
The first report by the Chinese authorities of the COVID-
19 outbreak appeared in December 31, 2019. Ever since
then, theWorldHealthOrganization (WHO) and national
public health authorities have been tracing and reporting
on the evolution of the outbreak. As initially feared, and
despite containment measures adopted in China, with a
big city like Wuhan being quarantined for weeks, the dis-
ease spread beyond mainland China. As of February 29,
2020, there were 85,403 cases worldwide, of which 79,394
corresponded to China [1]. As of April 13, 2020, there
are 1,773,084 cases worldwide, of which 166,019 are in
Spain [2]. Three months into the outbreak, much is still
unknown about the natural history of the disease and the
pathogen. Important from the modeling perspective, for
instance, it has been claimed that a large number of cases
might have gone undetected by routinely screening pas-
sengers, due to the special characteristics of this disease
[3]. Admittedly, several studies predict that only between
10 and 20% of the cases have been detected and reported
[4–7].
As with any other novel disease, governments, public
health services, and the scientific community have been
working towards stopping the spreading of COVID-19
as soon as possible and with the lowest possible impact
on the population [5, 8–10]. From a scientific point of
view, there are two courses of action that can be fol-
lowed. On the one hand, new vaccines and pharmaceutical
interventions need to be developed. This usually requires
months of work. Therefore, on the other hand, it is impor-
tant to study the large-scale spatial spreading of the dis-
ease through mathematical and computational modeling,
which allows evaluating “in silico” what-if scenarios and
potential containment measures to stop or delay the dis-
ease. This modeling effort is key, as it can contribute to
maximize the effectiveness of any protection measures
and gain time to develop new drugs or a vaccine to protect
the population. Here, we follow the modeling path and
analyze, through a data-driven stochastic SEIRmetapopu-
lation model, the temporal and spatial transmission of the
COVID-19 disease in Spain as well as the expected impact
of possible and customary containment measures.
Ourmodel allows to implement and quantify the impact
of several conventional strategies in Spain. These policies
are mostly aimed at reducing the mobility of individuals,
but we also include other plausible settings like a reduc-
tion in the time for case detection and isolation. Our
findings agree with previous results in the literature that
have reported that a reduction as large as 90% in traffic
flow has a limited effect on the spreading of the disease.
Important enough and at variance with such studies, the
data-driven nature of this study and the available dataset
allowed us to disentangle the impact of each transporta-
tion mode in several scenarios of mobility reduction in
Spain. We found that while shutting down completely any
transportation means does not lead to a significant reduc-
tion in the incidence of the disease, in some contexts, the
arrival of the peak of the disease is delayed by several
days, which could eventually be advantageous. Altogether,
we provide evidences supporting the adoption of a mixed
strategy that combines some mobility restrictions with,
mainly, the early identification of infectious individuals
and their isolation. These conclusions agree with the rec-
ommendations by the WHO [11]. We also highlight that
although this study has been made with data from Spain,
our findings can also be valid for any other country given
the ubiquity of mobility patterns worldwide.
Since this article was first submitted in early March,
we have learned more about the characteristics of the
COVID-19, yet much is still unknown. Despite this, the
overall results of this article still hold, since it was deliber-
ately focused on qualitative behaviors rather than precise
quantitative predictions. In fact, as of 13 April, it is still
unknown the actual reach of the outbreak in Spain. Some
estimates indicate that the actual fraction of infected indi-
viduals is 20 to 200 times larger than the number of
detected cases [12]. As such, any study based on fitting the
exact values reported by the authorities would be inher-
ently flawed, even more if we take into account that the
actual delay between symptoms’ onset to official regis-
tration of the case is 14 days (added to the long period
between infection and symptom onset, this implies that
current figures are due to infections that took place more
than 20 days ago). There are several other issues with the
current data provided by the authorities, which we explain
in more detail in the supplementary material (Additional
file 1: section 4). As a consequence, it is currently not
possible to use these figures to fit simple models and
produce precise quantitative predictions. In order to do
so, not only we need to collect much more information
but also a great deal of forensic data analysis will have
to be performed to curate the data—something beyond
the scope of this early assessment. Nevertheless, there are
some characteristics of this outbreak that can be already
analyzed, even with this simplified modeling framework,
and we have included some comments related to such
observations.
Methods
Stochastic SEIR metapopulation models are routinely
used to study the temporal and spatial transmission of
diseases like the COVID-19 [13]. Here, we make use of
such class of models and implement a data-driven ver-
sion that allows obtaining realistic estimates for the spatial
incidence of the disease as well as its temporal dynam-
ics. More specifically, in terms of time, we feed the model
with the available data as of February 28, 2020. Spa-
tially, we consider that each province (there are 52 in
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Spain, see Additional file 1: section 2) [14, 15] is rep-
resented by a subpopulation. Furthermore, metapopula-
tion models are composed by two types of dynamics:
the disease dynamics governed by the chosen compart-
mental model, SEIR in our case, and the mobility of the
individuals across the subpopulations that make up the
whole metapopulation system. The latter ingredient, the
mobility, connects the subpopulations and allows the dis-
ease to spread from one subpopulation to another. In
what follows, we describe these two components of our
model.
Mobility dynamics
To model the mobility of individuals, we use a data-
driven approach. Data-driven modeling, at variance with
more theoretically inspired methods, has the advantage of
allowing the direct implementation and evaluation of real-
istic containment measures, thus producing scalable and
actionable what-if scenarios. To this end, we have obtained
the inter-provincemobility flows provided by theMinistry
of Development of Spain (see Additional file 1: section 1)
[16, 17]. Therefore, the minimal spatial unit in our sys-
tem is a province. Using the information from themobility
matrices that report the origin and destination (OD) of
individual movements, at each time step, we sample the
number of individuals on the move from each province
and distribute them across the country according to the
information contained in these OD matrices. Important
enough, this dataset not only includes the total number
of individuals going from province to province, but it also
distinguishes the main transportation means used by the
individuals, see Fig. 1. This will allow us to gauge the effect
of travel restrictions on different transportation modes.
Furthermore, given that the epidemic started abroad, it
is important to determine in which province the disease
is more likely to be seeded first. As of 1 March, given
the global spread and incidence of the epidemic, we take
into account that the three countries with more cases are
China, South Korea, and Italy and consider that the most
plausible route for an infectious individual to reach Spain
is by plane. Thus, we collected the number of passen-
gers coming from each country to each Spanish airport in
2019 from the Spanish air navigationmanager AENA [15].
Then, we assigned each Spanish airport to its correspond-
ing province and ranked them according to their total
number of operations with each country, see Fig. 2. It is
worth noticing that the information provided by AENA is
already aggregated by country. Thus, this ranking cannot
take into account which airports are mostly connected to
locations where the outbreak is currently concentrated—
e.g., north of Italy. Nevertheless, the ranking constitutes
a valid proxy, and a good starting point, to seed the
disease.
Disease dynamics
The dynamics of the disease is governed by an SEIR com-
partmental model. In this model, individuals are classified
according to their health status: susceptible (S) if they
are susceptible to catch the disease, exposed (E) if they
have been infected but cannot infect other individuals yet,
infectious (I) once the latency period is over and the indi-
viduals can infect others, and removed (R) when they are
either recovered or deceased. Within each province, the
transition between compartments results from the fol-
lowing rules, iterated at each time step, corresponding to
1 day:
S→E: Susceptible individuals in province i are infected
with probability
Pi(S → I) = 1 − (1 − R0/(TINi))Ii , where R0 is
the reproduction number, TI is the mean
infectious time, Ni stands for the number of
individuals in region i, and Ii accounts for the
number of infectious individuals in such region.
E→I: Exposed individuals become infectious at a rate
inversely proportional to the mean latent period,
TE .
I→R: Infectious individuals become removed at a rate
inversely proportional to the mean infectious
period, TI .
In what follows, we parameterize the model according
to the latest estimates as of 1March for the disease param-
eters [5, 18], namely, R0 = 2.5, and a generation time
Tg = TE + TI = 7.5 days resulting from considering
TE = 5.2 days and TI = 2.3 days (in the supplemen-
tary material, we report that similar results are obtained
for other values of Tg , as well as if we allow for pre-
symptomatic transmission and higher values of R0, inline
with the most recent estimates as of 13 April, Additional
file 1: figures S5-S13). Note that we have not explicitly
distinguished between pre-symptomatic, asymptomatic,
or symptomatic individuals, being all of them under the
category of infectious individuals. Asymptomatic spread-
ing is still under scrutiny. Although there is increas-
ingly more evidence of this transmission route, it is still
unknown their relative infectiousness or the amount of
actual asymptomatic or mild-symptomatic individuals in
the population, with different studies estimating that from
20 to 50% of the infected individuals are asymptomatic
[19–24]. It is important to note that it is possible to test
positive but develop symptoms several days afterwards,
implying that those individuals were pre-symptomatic
rather than asymptomatic [22, 25]. Nevertheless, for this
early assessment, the inclusion of this type of spreaders
would not modify substantially the dynamics under study
since we focus on analyzing the most basic strategies to
contain or mitigate the outbreak. In any case, once more
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Fig. 1Mobility dynamics in Spain. We use a dataset that includes all possible transportation means, from airplanes to cars. a, b The international
fluxes to Spain. c A breakdown of inter-province flows in Spain by transportation mode. The size of the nodes is proportional to the number of
individuals leaving the province. Similarly, the width of the links is proportional to the number of individuals using that route. Note that for
multimodal travels, the associated mode is the one that corresponds to the largest part of the trip, which explains why there are links from the
islands to provinces without ports in the matrix corresponding to maritime trips
data is gathered, both about the dynamics related to these
subjects and the actual reach of the current outbreak,
these new states should be included into these models to
properly understand the whole situation.
Results and discussion
Quantifying the spatial and temporal evolution of the
disease incidence
One of the main characteristics of the COVID-19 dis-
ease is its long latency times. As of 1 March, the average
incubation period has been reported to be 5.2 days [18].
Thus, before proceeding with evaluating the impact of
the disease, we first compare the metapopulation model
employed here with a classical SIR metapopulation frame-
work. To do so, we use the random-walk effective dis-
tance:








where P(j|j) is the normalized flow matrix without row
and column j, p(j) is the j column of P with element j
removed, and δ is a dimensionless parameter that depends
on the infection, recovery, and mobility rates [26]. This
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Fig. 2 International connections. The number of operations (both passengers and cargo) in 2019 from any airport in China, South Korea, and Italy to
each Spanish airport. Only Madrid and Barcelona have direct passenger connections to China and South Korea, whereas Zaragoza only has freight
connections to such locations. The destination provinces are ranked according to the likelihood of receiving an infected individual from each
country, assuming the order is proportional to the total number of operations
quantity, defined for SIR metapopulation models, gives
us the expected time that it would take for the dis-
ease to reach each subpopulation of the system, also
known as the hitting time. In Fig. 3, we compare the
hitting time obtained from stochastic simulations of the
SEIRmetapopulationmodel with the theoretical distances
derived for the simplified SIR model. We can see that the
correlation is nearly perfect, implying that the spreading
itself is quite similar in both models. However, we find
that the hitting times in the SEIR implementation are at
Fig. 3 Hitting time in SIR and SEIR models. Comparison between the
hitting time obtained after 103 simulations of the SEIR model in our
metapopulation scheme, with 1 or 10 seeds initially placed in the
province of Barcelona, and the theoretical distance in an SIR
metapopulation model
least three times larger than the theoretical ones for the
SIR scenario (on its turn, stochastic simulations of the SIR
model agree very well with the theoretical expectations
for the model, see the Additional file 1: Fig. S4). Thus, the
addition of the latent state produces a substantial delay
on the spreading of the epidemic. This is in line with
the fact that the epidemic is thought to have started in
mid-November or early December; however, a noticeable
number of cases was only reported by early January.
Figure 4a shows the expected hitting time for each
region (the 52 provinces of Spain are divided in 17 regions,
see Additional file 1: section 2) when a disease starts in
Madrid with 1 infected individual. As before, the hitting
times might seem long, but this is due to the long latent
periods of the disease, which is in agreement with the evo-
lution of reported cases in mainland China. We also note
that Spanishmajor cities are expected to be affected by the
outbreak in no more than 40 days, although this number
is reduced if pre-symptomatic infections are taken into
account (see Additional file 1: Fig. S7). In either case, the
qualitative behavior is the same since it is a consequence of
the underlying data-driven flow dynamics . For instance,
the disease would arrive sooner to the Canary Islands,
which are situated over 1700 km away from Madrid, than
to Ceuta orMelilla, which are only over 500 km away from
Madrid, due to the higher amount of traffic between those
regions.
To confirm the validity of the model and the data used,
in Fig. 4b, we show the expected number of days that
it would take for each region to reach 50 infected indi-
viduals, compared to the day in which the said number
is reached in Madrid. Various clarifications are in order.
First, during the month of February, several imported
cases from Italy were found, and isolated, all around Spain
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Fig. 4 Temporal spreading of the epidemic. In a, we show the hitting time obtained when one seed is introduced in Madrid. In b, we compare the
number of days needed to reach 50 infectious individuals since that number is reached in Madrid. The simulations are seeded with 5 individuals in
Madrid, 1 in La Rioja, and 1 in Álava (País Vasco)
(see the chronology of the outbreak in Additional file 1:
section 3) [27–55] As such, it is too soon to determine
the exact number of seeds—and their location. This is out
of the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we have consid-
ered a simple approach. We introduced just one single
infected individual inMadrid, which has been the hardest-
hit region during the outbreak. This leads to a correlation
between the time needed to reach 50 infectious individu-
als in each region and in Madrid of 0.79 (see Additional
file 1: Fig. S5). The correlation can be enhanced if we intro-
duce some extra information. For instance, during the first
days of March, a large cluster of over 60 cases, shared
between the provinces of La Rioja and Álava, was detected
and linked to a funeral that took place on 24 February,
which was attended by a couple who had recently been
to Italy. To take into account this event, we introduce two
additional seeds, one in each province, at the beginning
of the simulation, which rises the correlation to 0.90 (see
Additional file 1: Fig. S5). Furthermore, if we increase the
number of initial seeds in Madrid to 5 (to account for the
fact that the disease might have arrived there several days
before 24 February), the correlation goes up to 0.93, as
shown in Fig. 4b. Although different seed choices lead to
different results, it is clear that the qualitative behavior
of the model holds and is able to reproduce the observed
early evolution of the outbreak properly. Furthermore,
even though the results in Fig. 4b only match qualitatively
the observations, the agreement is much closer if we allow
for pre-symptomatic infections (see Additional file 1: Fig.
S6), signaling that this type of infections might have been
crucial in the early development of the outbreak.
Complementarily to Fig. 4, we present in Fig. 5 further
results on the temporal and spatial evolution of the disease
dynamics. Here, we have computed, through stochastic
simulations of the model, the cumulative median num-
ber of infected individuals within each region assuming
that the disease propagates from Madrid (top row) or
Barcelona (bottom row) by initially 1 infectious individ-
ual. The results align with the theoretical predictions and
highlight the close relationship between the two biggest
cities of Spain (Barcelona and Madrid), even though they
are relatively far geographically (around 620 km through
the shortest path by car). Furthermore, this figure also sig-
nals that one of the reasons why the disease might have
had such a heavy outcome in Spain is because it started
in Madrid. Indeed, under the same conditions, the spa-
tial spread of the disease would have been much lower if
it had started in Barcelona by the time the containment
measures were put in place by the government. Finally,
it is worth remarking two things. First, pre-symptomatic
spreading would accelerate the dynamics, although the
qualitative geographical distribution of cases should not
be affected (see Additional file 1: Fig. S7). Additionally,
we also stress the many unknowns that cannot be taken
into account yet, such as inflow of infected subjects from
abroad. However, as we show next, this data-driven mod-
eling approach allows evaluating the effect of customary
containment measures.
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Fig. 5 Spatial spreading of the epidemic. Estimated cumulative number of infected individuals within each region when the disease starts with 1
infected individual in Madrid (top row) or in Barcelona (bottom row). The reported values are the median over 103 simulations
Containment of the epidemic
Our data-driven model is particularly useful to get
insights into mobility-mediated transmission dynamics
and to evaluate possible countermeasures. Next, we
explore diverse containment measures that could be
implemented aiming at stopping the large-scale spread-
ing of the disease. First, we analyze the effect of imposing
mobility restrictions by limiting traffic flow in the coun-
try. We consider six different scenarios that correspond to
each transportation mode being shutdown plus another
one in which a total reduction of 90% of the overall traf-
fic is imposed. However drastic these measures appear to
be, actually, the lockdown declared on 14 March reduced
the overall traffic between provinces between 80 and 90%
[56]. Nonetheless, as we show below, thesemeasures alone
are useless when it comes to completely stop the disease
from propagating. Indeed, a significant reduction in the
estimated incidence is only obtained when other actions
are implemented.
In Fig. 6a, it is observed that the previous measures have
no effect on the final size of the epidemic. On the other
hand, if we look at the time for the peak of the epidemic
to arrive, Fig. 6b, we see some minor effects. In particular,
although shutting downmost modes of transportation has
practically no effect, if all private cars were removed (i.e.,
they remain confined in their corresponding province),
the peak of the epidemic would be delayed by about 7
days. The most effective of the above scenarios of mobility
restriction corresponds to a 90% reduction of the overall
traffic, when the peak would be delayed over 20 days. This
is in agreement with previous studies that have shown that
the only sizable effect of travel restrictions is to delay the
peak of the epidemic. For instance, it has been claimed
that the travel restrictions inWuhan only delayed the peak
of the epidemic by 3 days [5].
Another possibility, instead of limiting the mobility of
the overall population, is to be extremely vigilant so as
to make it possible to isolate all the cases that start to
appear quickly enough. To check the impact of this policy,
we have simulated a scenario in which the average num-
ber of days that an individual is able to go unnoticed and
infect others is reduced from 2.3 to 2, 1.5, and 1 days.
In Fig. 6c, we observe that this strategy is much more
effective than traffic restrictions. In particular, if we were
Aleta and Moreno BMCMedicine          (2020) 18:157 Page 8 of 12
Fig. 6 Strategies to mitigate the impact of the disease. a, b The impact of mobility reduction. c–f The effect of different measures aimed at reducing
the spreading of the epidemic when they are applied since the beginning of the outbreak and after 100 or 1000 cases are detected in the whole
country. a The fraction of individuals who where affected by the disease by the end of the epidemic. b The time from the arrival of the first infected
individual to the country until the peak of the epidemic, i.e., the day with the maximum number of infected individuals. In c, we evaluate the size of
the epidemic if individuals are hospitalized or isolated after a given number of days from the onset of disease symptoms. In d, we show the effect of
only hospitalizing or isolating a certain fraction of individuals after they experience the first symptoms. In e, f, we show the size of the epidemic and
the time for the disease to peak when transmission is reduced. Note that reducing the transmissibility always delays the spreading, except in
situations where the disease dies out, for which the peak occurs earlier. In all cases, the spreading starts with 10 infected individuals in Barcelona
able to reduce the time since symptoms’ onset to isolation
below 1.5 days, the epidemic would be greatly reduced. As
a matter of fact, it has been reported [18] that this aver-
age number of days went down in China from 4.4 days at
the beginning of the outbreak to 2.6 days, which is one of
the reasons invoked to explain why the epidemic started
to decline in mainland China. In our case, these numbers
would be compatible with generation times of 10 or 12.5
days, or with the addition of pre-symptomatic spreading
(see Additional file 1: Figs. S9 and S12). As of 13 April,
the median time from symptom onset to hospitalization
in Spain is 6 days (see Additional file 1: Fig. S2). As such,
this measure alone will not currently be able to stop the
spreading of the outbreak in Spain.
Furthermore, it is also reasonable to assume that this
strategy is not easy to implement in full, either because
some individuals could purportedly try to avoid isolation
or due to the fact that many infected subjects have mild
symptoms similar to a common flu and neither go to the
doctor nor report their state. Therefore, we have simu-
lated a slightly different scenario in which individuals are
isolated the same day of their symptoms’ onset with a
certain efficacy. That is, only a given percentage of the
new cases are isolated, while the others are able to roam
freely. This framework would also be compatible with hav-
ing asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic individuals who
are able to spread the disease. The equivalence with such
hypothetical natural history of the disease in our model
is such because we do not apply the prescribed percent-
age to the total number of infectious individuals, but only
to those who have just become infectious; thus, those that
escape will remain infectious as if they were asymptomatic
until they recover. In Fig. 6d, we show the effect that dif-
ferent percentages of new isolated cases would have on
the size of the outbreak. Being able to isolate all individ-
uals, on average, in less than 1 day enables to effectively
stop the disease. Yet, the results also show that even if all
infectious are not isolated, the size of the outbreak can be
greatly reduced.
Lastly, we analyzed the consequences of self-protection
measures such as wearing masks, washing more fre-
quently one’s hands, or avoiding crowded places. To
mimic these contexts, we simply reduced the effectivity of
the transmission by a certain fraction and study the final
size of the epidemic, see Fig. 6e. The results show that a
large reduction of at least 60% is needed to contain the
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disease. Interestingly, if we look at the time to the peak
of the epidemic, represented in Fig. 6f, we observe that
decreasing the transmission not only reduces the size of
the outbreak but also delays the peak. Hence, even if this
strategy might not be sufficient to completely stop the
propagation of the disease in all cases, it could certainly
help for preparedness and other clinical responses by
delaying the spreading. The exception is when the reduc-
tion is very large (in the figure, beyond 60%) as in these
cases the peakmight occur earlier because the disease dies
out.
Conclusions
It is apparent from all the results obtained for the dif-
ferent scenarios that we have considered that the most
cost-effective strategy would be the isolation or quaran-
tine of detected infectious cases, as long as the efficacy
of such measure is over 50%. Important for the current
debate about the natural history of the disease, this policy
would also work if there is a fraction of asymptomatic but
infectious individuals in the population. Our results also
show that from a practical point of view, a combination of
all the analyzed contexts can have second order benefits.
As already stressed, containment measures should not
only be directed towards a full cut-down of the number of
infected cases. Their efficacy is also given by other factors,
such as delaying, even if only by a few days, the spreading
of the disease. Such delays are always good for prepared-
ness and to have more time for clinical research that can
lead to new pharmacological treatments or vaccines. For
instance, even if traffic restrictions are not effective on
their own, they facilitate the control of the population,
and thus, it would be easier to detect infected individ-
uals and treat them. Similarly, self-protection measures
and other social-distancing practices delay the spreading
of the disease, freeing resources that would allow for a
better management of the epidemic, in turn leading to
an increase of the efficacy of individual isolation. Closing
public places would, in practice, reduce the transmission,
which again will lower the total number of infections
and thus make them more manageable for the health
care system. This also highlights the importance of hav-
ing a coordinated response system, since simply adopting
central measures like imposing mobility restrictions and
closing public places is not effective in the middle to long
term.
This study also highlights the importance of introducing
data-driven mobility patterns of the population. We show
that under the same conditions, the spatial spreading of
the disease would have been completely different if it had
started in Barcelona rather than inMadrid, even if they are
both the most important cities in Spain. Furthermore, this
result also calls for the need of coordinated containment
actions, both at the country and higher levels, to mitigate
the spreading of the disease. Indeed, even though a full
lockdown of the country would have had a minimal effect,
from the spatial point of view, on the situation simulated
in Fig. 5 when the disease is seeded in Madrid, the same
strategy would have had a great effect if it had started in
Barcelona. Yet, if only the province of Barcelona were to be
isolated—something that might seem reasonable since in
the rest of the provinces the prevalence is fairly low in this
hypothetical situation and thus might have been unno-
ticed by the authorities—that would have not stopped the
spreading at all, in line with our observations that mobil-
ity reductions on their own delay the peak of the epidemic
but do not stop the outbreak.
Our model has several limitations, and some of them
could actually be overcome in the near future. Perhaps,
the most important one has to do with the inability of cur-
rent large-scale epidemiological models to fully account
for behavioral changes in the population when a disease is
evolving. An interesting observation in this regard is that
on 9 March, the region of Madrid announced the closure
of all schools and universities, including some residence
halls. As a consequence, hundreds of students went back
to their home regions [38]. This might have accelerated
the spreading of the disease since the symptoms in young
individuals are quite mild and thus might have transmit-
ted the disease unawerely. Even more, almost 30% of all
university students in Madrid come from other Spanish
regions [57]. The extent of this effect is for sure some-
thing worth exploring in the future and signals how this
discipline—in relation with the introduction of behavioral
changes—is still in its infancy. Furthermore, as it is the
case for the spreading of COVID-19, the information—
and more often than desired, misinformation—travels
faster than the disease. This produces undesired effects
such as a collapse in the emergency rooms at hospitals, a
proliferation of information sources that do not provide
sensible advices in all cases, anticipated economic loses,
and, in general, uncoordinated responses. Therefore, it
is a pressing challenge to develop more realistic ways to
incorporate in models like the one employed here all these
risk-averse responses and reactions. Another limitation
of the current study includes the relatively low spatial
resolution, which is essentially determined by the data
availability. The results, however, indicate that the level of
granularity used here is enough to capture mobility pat-
terns and the effects of possible interventions. Finally, we
have not considered the temporal and spatial variability of
disease parameters, such as the one induced by seasonal-
ity (which current estimates signal that will have a small
impact on the spreading of the disease due to the huge
proportion of the population still susceptible [58]). We
have also not included other potentially important char-
acteristics of the host population such as the existence of
super spreaders or the age structure, which seems to play a
Aleta and Moreno BMCMedicine          (2020) 18:157 Page 10 of 12
relevant role for this disease, at least in what concerns the
case fatality rate. We plan to investigate on all these issues
in the near future.
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